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A DEFENSE OF CUSTOM AND CONDUCT
David V. Snyder*
EW questions are undermining old faith in the legal worth of cus-
tom and conduct in private transactions. Scholars of law and eco-
nomics, reinforced by a neoformalist movement, have suggested
that custom' and conduct 2 be removed from judicial view. This Article,
while trying to learn from these criticisms, gives an assent-based justifica-
tion for construing contracts in light of custom and conduct.3 Somehow
the detailed objections of different schools have obscured assent as the
fundamental criterion of contractual liability. Uncovering assent shows
that custom and conduct still have a role to play. It also suggests limits
for that role. The context for this argument is the recodification of usage
of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance as constituents of
an agreement under the Uniform Commercial Code. This Article is
meant to help justify their retention in light of recent criticism.
Assuming that the parties' assent is central, this Article suggests that
custom and conduct should be understood as part of the parties' lan-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, William & Mary. Chair, UCC Subcommit-
tee on Article 1, American Bar Association. The views expressed herein are solely the
individual opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Article
1 Subcommittee, the ABA, or any other body. I gratefully acknowledge a research grant
from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund and research assistance from Donald Amirault, Kerri
Lyman, and Julie Windhorn. I would also like to thank my hosts at Boston University
School of Law, where I was a visiting professor during the time that much of this Article
was written. In addition, I want to thank Professor James G. Wilson for leading me to
Wittgenstein and Professors Lisa Bernstein, Peter Linzer, Dennis Patterson, and William J.
Woodward, Jr., and participants in faculty workshops at Boston University, Indiana Uni-
versity-Bloomington, and the University of Cincinnati for offering comments on an ear-
lier draft. Errors, of course, are mine alone.
1. "Custom" here refers to that which is ordinarily done in similar situations. It is
roughly equivalent to usage of trade as defined in U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1999).
2. "Conduct" here refers to what the contracting parties actually have done in the
situation at hand. It is roughly equivalent to course of dealing, see id. § 1-205(1), and
course of performance, see id. § 2-208(1).
3. This Article attempts to follow standard definitions of "construction" and "inter-
pretation." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 & cmt. c (1981) (discussing
how "[i]nterpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of
its meaning," while "construction" is the determination of its legal operation). However,
because the view suggested here is that the parties' manifested assent-their "meaning" as
understood in light of custom and conduct-should be given legal effect, the distinction
between interpretation and construction to some extent collapses.
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guage, and that their performance of the contract should be understood
as a legal formality.4 Language, as Wittgenstein taught and as the draft-
ers of the original Code knew, consists of more than words. Parties ex-
press themselves not only through verbal conduct, but through nonverbal
conduct. Both verbal and nonverbal conduct are necessary components
of language; both are essential ingredients in understanding the parties'
manifestations of assent. Custom, or in the phrase of the Code, "usage of
trade," 5 is part of the language that parties use to express themselves to
each other and to others. The parties' own past conduct in dealing with
each other (their "course of dealing") 6 makes up part of this customary
language too.
The parties' conduct in performing the contract in question (their
"course of performance") 7 is also part of their expression, but it is harder
to view performance, which comes later, as a linguistic tool to understand
previous expressions. The argument here is not simply linguistic, how-
ever. A course of performance constitutes a "natural formality," in Lon
Fuller's words.8 For that reason it is a valuable tool in deciding the legal
content of a contracting party's obligation. To be sure, this argument
hearkens to days before the "neo-" was added to "formalism," when for-
malities meant something more than mere words. Current scholars of
law and economics, and the proponents of neoformalism, have empha-
sized verbal conduct-especially written words, and the "plain meaning"
of those words.9 A seal, however, the archetype of legal formalities, is
nonverbal conduct. Nonverbal conduct may be a better indicator of as-
sent than verbal conduct, especially when making judgments about legal
relations.
There is much at stake here, if we take the parties' assent to be impor-
tant. If the neoformalists' views prevail, courts will be constrained to the
written terms of an agreement when deciding the content of the parties'
contract. The context for those written terms-as shown by how those
terms are used in the industry-will be stripped away. The evidence of
what the parties took those terms to mean-as shown by what the parties
have actually done when dealing with each other-will be pushed outside
the court's gaze. Parties who would have won a case, if more evidence
were presented, will lose because the facts showing their assent will be
excluded. Other parties may try to counteract these results by trying to
capture more in their written contracts. If so, this effort will cost them
some real expense (the cost of specifying all the terms that usually go
unspecified because they are assumed). In any event, such a regime
4. A "legal formality" as used here refers to such institutions as an impressed seal, a
signed writing, or manual delivery.
5. U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
6. Id. § 1-205(1).
7. Id. § 2-208(1).
8. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 815 (1941).
9. See infra Part II. See generally Symposium: Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHi. L.
REV. 527 (1999) [hereinafter Symposium]; Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 848 (2000).
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would mean that a judge's uninformed understanding of the papers will
prevail over the parties' manifestations of assent, understood in the con-
text of their industry and their transaction.
From many perspectives, such a regime is undesirable. In previous
generations of scholarship, two large-scale arguments were mounted
against it. The first is represented by Llewellyn, Corbin, and the Legal
Realists. They sought to show that apparent formalism hid other desider-
ata, that the purported certainty of formalism was an illusion, however
attractive.' 0 The second is represented by Ian Macneil and the theorists
of relational contracts. They argue that many contracts develop over the
life of a contractual relationship, and that not all of the content of a con-
tract is captured in the agreement reached at an earlier point in the rela-
tionship." For many, these two schools of thought are as persuasive now,
in response to the neoformalists, as they were against the paleoformalists.
Indeed, their arguments carry real weight for me as well.
The realist and relational arguments will not be rehearsed here, how-
ever, and the one-sentence summaries in the preceding paragraph can
hardly do justice to these schools of thought. Instead, this Article ad-
vances arguments that are more sympathetic to the basic concern of the
neoformalists. The neoformalists emphasize language and formality.
This piece shows how custom and conduct are part of what we should
understand as language and formality. These ideas are elaborated in the
following pages. Part I introduces the essential framework, briefly ex-
plaining the current treatment of these issues in the Code as well as the
proposed revisions to the Code. Part II summarizes some of the recent
challenges to Llewellyn's conception and offers a partial critique of some
of those challenges. The primary argument of the Article appears in
Parts III and IV. Part III elaborates and defends the thesis given in the
preceding paragraphs. Part IV discusses some of the limits on custom
and conduct.
10. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 n.46 (1965); Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales,
52 HARV. L. REV. 873, 877 (1939) ("[D]octrine ... tends into blunt broad form which
guides decision little, hides the actual process of deciding, [and] leaves little record of the
intuitional influence of the varying fact-pressures."). Obviously the literature of Legal Re-
alism cannot be collected in this footnote. Perhaps the best introduction to Llewellyn and
the Realists is still WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
(1973).
11. The foundations of the theory are in Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Con-
tracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974), and Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentia-
tion, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974). For Professor Macneil's more recent views, see Relational
Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877 (2000), which is contained
in a symposium on relational contract theory. Another good starting point for understand-
ing the relational arguments and their impact (or lack thereof) is William C. Whitford, Ian
Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 545 (1985).
SMU LAW REVIEW
I. THE ONCE AND FUTURE CODE
The UCC exalted and transformed the roles of custom and conduct. 12
The Code not only makes custom and conduct relevant to interpreting an
agreement; it makes them part of the agreement itself. "Agreement" is
defined to "includ[e] course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance.' 1 3 Llewellyn figured that "the bargain of the parties in
fact"'14 must include not only their words but also the surrounding cir-
cumstances, necessarily including custom and conduct. 15 Thus the Code
strategy is said to "incorporate" any applicable usage of trade, course of
dealing, or course of performance into the agreement; the scheme is
sometimes called the "incorporation" strategy.
The definition of "agreement" holds throughout the Code. It appears
in Article 1 with other general provisions. It is not limited to the sale or
lease of goods under Articles 2 and 2A. 16 The definition therefore gov-
erns secured transactions' 7 and the various commercial transactions gov-
erned by other articles,' 8 although there is some controversy over the
12. For a classic article, see Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975). For a thorough treatment of the
regime under the present Code, see Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in
Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms," and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777 (1986).
13. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
14. Id.
15. For a more extended history of these sections, as well as Llewellyn's and other
contemporary views, see DENNIS M. PATrERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY:
TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY 20-35 (1990) (incorporating Dennis M. Patterson, Good
Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 169 (1989), and Dennis M. Patterson,
Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under
Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1988)).
16. Curiously, "course of performance" receives full treatment in Articles 2 and 2A,
see U.C.C. §§ 2-208, 2A-207, not Article 1, see U.C.C. § 1-205.
17. See id. § 9-105(l) (defining a "security agreement" as "an agreement which creates
or provides for a security interest"). The revised definition, § 9-102(a)(73), is nearly identi-
cal. See also, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 872-73 & n.3 (10th
Cir. 1981) (holding that course of performance may result in waiver of term in security
agreement governed by Article 9); Nat'l Livestock Credit Corp. v. Schultz, 653 P.2d 1243,
1246-47 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (applying waiver principles from § 2-208(3) to security
agreement under Article 9, despite argument that they only apply to Articles 2 and 2A).
18. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-409 (stating that an acceptance of a negotiable instrument is
a kind of "agreement" that "may consist of the drawee's signature alone"), 4-103 (allowing
variation "by agreement"), 4-401 ("An item is properly payable if it is authorized by the
customer and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and bank."), 5-
104 (stating letters of credit may be authenticated "in accordance with the agreement of
the parties"), 8-104(d) (including "agreement to transfer ... a security"); see also J.R. Hale
Contracting Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581 (N.M. 1990) (allowing evidence of
course of dealing in repayment of note); Driftwood Manor Investors v. City Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 305 S.E.2d 204, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an Article 3 note
holder who repeatedly accepts late installments waives right to accelerate because of sub-
sequent late payment unless the payor is first notified that prompt payment will be re-
quired). For further treatment, see David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept
of Change: Public and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel,
1999 Wis. L. REV. 607, 649-53.
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course-of-performance element. 19
Under Article 1, "usage of trade" are the Code words for industry cus-
tom. 20 A "course of dealing" is more specific, being "a sequence of previ-
ous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction."' It is
understood as the parties' dealings with each other "previous" to the
agreement in question.22 A "course of performance" is more specific
still, being defined as the parties' conduct with respect to the contract at
issue.23 The Code appears to rank the terms according to their specific-
ity. If all the constituents of the agreement cannot be construed harmoni-
ously, the express terms of the agreement prevail over course of
performance, which prevails over course of dealing, which prevails over
usage of trade.
As has been pointed out before, however, the ranking can be upset 24
(and perhaps Llewellyn never intended a strict hierarchy anyway). 25 For
instance, a course of performance may result in a waiver or a modifica-
tion, thus displacing the express terms. In addition, a course of dealing or
usage of trade may be used to interpret the express terms until they ap-
proach nonexistence. In the familiar case of Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v.
Royster Co., for instance, the parties agreed to a sale over three years of a
minimum of 31,000 tons of phosphate. 26 The stated price was subject to
escalation with the cost of production. 27 The court allowed evidence of
course of dealing or usage of trade to show that the dealer was obligated
to adjust the price and/or quantity downwards to reflect a declining mar-
ket when the contract contained no term with respect to a declining mar-
ket.2 8 On one view of the case, a fixed term that could only increase was
remade by a court to decrease. A seller who laid off the risk of a declin-
19. PATTERSON, supra note 15, at 187-89 (suggesting that course of performance
should be kept out of Article 9) (citing Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank,
18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv., 526 (Minn. 1976)). Although I have learned a great deal from Pro-
fessor Patterson's work-and indeed wish only that I had found it sooner-we may disa-
gree on this point.
20. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) defines "usage of trade" as "any practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."
21. "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of un-
derstanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Id. § 1-205(1).
22. See id. § 1-205 cmt. 2; 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 3-3 (4th Practitioners ed. 1995).
23. "Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by ei-
ther party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection
to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection
shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement." Id. § 2-208(1).
24. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplemen-
tation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997); 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 22, § 3-3; see also
Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the U.C.C. Theory, 1977 U. ILL.
L. REV. 811; PATTERSON, supra note 15, at 20-31; Snyder, supra note 18, at 632-34.
25. See PATrERSON, supra note 15, at 20-23, 143.
26. 451 F.2d 3, 6 (4th Cir. 1971).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 9-11.
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ing market was reassigned that risk through course of dealing and usage
of trade. The express terms hardly prevailed.
Despite the criticism engendered by Columbia Nitrogen and similar
cases, 29 the proposed revision to the UCC is continuing the roles of usage
of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance. They remain in
the definition of "agreement. ' 30 Moreover, course of performance now
appears with usage of trade and course of dealing in revised Article 1.31
The revision thus strengthens the role of course of performance, putting
to rest any remaining doubts32 about its applicability throughout the
Code.
II. RECENT OBJECTIONS TO CUSTOM AND CONDUCT
Recent scholarship has identified several potential problems with the
Code scheme. This Part summarizes some of the leading arguments in
the neoformalist school3 3 but suggests that opponents of incorporation
have not shown that the incorporation strategy should be discarded. To
the extent that these scholars would exclude custom and conduct from
judicial consideration, they would subordinate assent to other goals.
A. RELATIONSHIP-PRESERVING NORMS AND END-GAME NORMS
One sustained and scholarly attack on the incorporation strategy be-
gins with the observation that parties may behave one way during an
29. See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 794-805 (9th Cir.
1981); Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980); Steuber
v. Hercules, Inc., 646 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981); Modine Mfg. Co. v. North
East Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
30. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (Rev. 1998).
31. Id. § 1-303.
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. "Neoformalist" here refers to those who have recently grouped themselves under
the rubric of Formalism but who have strong (if perhaps latent) tendencies to Legal Real-
ism through their devotion to social scientific research and analysis. See Richard H. Pildes,
Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 617-19 (1999). See also infra notes 219 to 223
and accompanying text. David Charny calls neoformalism "anti-antiformalism." David
Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842 (1999). Compare
Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 823, 845 n.86 (2000) ("Those advocating the virulent strain of the new formalists
are neither realists nor relationalists and the sooner we say so the better."). My usage of
"neoformalism" is congruent with some but not all of the usages in the literature. Al-
though there are neoformalists working in several fields, this Article focuses on contracts
and commercial law. Annelise Riles discusses the neoformalists under the heading of
"New Formalists" in Annelise Riles, THE TRANSNATIONAL APPEAL OF FORMALISM: THE
CASE OF JAPAN'S NETrING LAW 7-12 (forthcoming) (collecting sources). For prominent
manifestations and discussions of the neoformalist phenomenon, see Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988), which interestingly appears in the same volume as
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949 (1988); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579
(1992). More recent, and more relevant to the current project, is the Symposium, supra
note 9. See also Free Bargaining and Formalism, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACF ch. 1 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999). Another participant in this symposium re-
sponds to the neoformalists in William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of
Forms, 2001 Wis. L. REV. - (forthcoming).
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ongoing relationship, adhering to "relationship-preserving norms," even
though they would expect written "end-game norms" to govern if the re-
lationship deteriorated into litigation.34 The implication, according to
Lisa Bernstein, is that courts should not use course of performance in
deciding contract disputes, as the course of performance would likely re-
present the informal norms that were in place when the relationship was
good. Moreover, she argues, if the parties fear that accommodations
made during a healthy relationship will be transformed into fixed con-
tract terms, the parties will be less likely to be accommodating even dur-
ing a good relationship. The result is rigidity,35 not the flexibility for
which the UCC aims. 36
There are responses to these arguments, however, even within the eco-
nomic camp. Jody Kraus and Steven Walt point out that Professor Bern-
stein's analysis does not account for the cost of specifying more terms in
the contract. 37 Omri Ben-Shahar has also written on this issue from
within the economic discipline, and although it is difficult to do justice to
his analysis in simple language and a short space, an effort is worthwhile.
First, he challenges Professor Bernstein's analysis. Although he recog-
nizes that relationship-preserving conduct may erode the end-game terms
written in the agreement, he notes a contrasting tendency: faced with this
prospect, parties are encouraged to take "antierosion" measures to assure
that their rights are not too far eroded. He shows that regardless of
whether the regime is the permissive one of the UCC or the plain-mean-
ing ideal of the neoformalist, 38 these two contrasting tendencies will al-
34. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996). Robert E. Scott had
also written about these ideas in A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 615 (1990); see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Im-
plied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 275-76 (1985) (stating it is "difficult to deter-
mine whether a particular act sheds light on the ex ante meaning of the agreement or
merely represents an ex post waiver").
35. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1807-15.
36. See U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 3.
37. See Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven
D. Walt eds., 2000) [hereinafter this book is referred to as KRAUS & WALT]. Parties will
not want to invest untold (much less infinite) resources in specifying every possible term
just in case a dispute arises. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Arti-
cle 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 780 (1999); W.
Bentley MacLeod, Complexity and Contract, 92 REVUE D'ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 149,
150 (Apr. 2000); Scott, supra note 9, at 862-63; Lawrence B. Solum, The Boundaries of
Legal Discourse and the Debate Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 311, 326-27 (1993). But see Richard Epstein, Confusion About Custom: Disentangling
Informal Customs from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 828
(1999) (most contracts are largely complete).
38. For an example of the neoformalism sought by some scholars, see Goetz & Scott,
supra note 34, at 311-16; Scott, supra note 9; Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Uniformity
Norm in Commercial Law: Optimal Institutional Design for Regulating Incomplete Con-
tracts, in KRAUS & WALT, supra note 37, at 162.
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ways precisely counterbalance each other.39 The legal regime is therefore
irrelevant, according to the first stage of the argument. Then Professor
Ben-Shahar widens his view and concludes that what had seemed irrele-
vant is actually relevant, but for reasons that were not obvious.40 In a
recent article, he demonstrates how the relatively permissive structure set
up by the Code, which allows course of performance to result in waiver or
estoppel, can actually encourage the creation of economic value.41
Other responses might be offered as well. The argument against incor-
poration neglects the possibility that courts can interpret relationship-
preserving conduct while also limiting it to its appropriate role.4 2 South-
ern Concrete Services v. Mableton Contractors, Inc.4 3 suggests this ap-
proach. The court was interpreting a contract for the sale of
"'approximately 70,000 cubic yards' of concrete from September 1, 1972
to June 15, 1973" at $19.60 per cubic yard.44 The buyer only took about
12,000 cubic yards, and the seller sued. Relying on Columbia Nitrogen,45
the buyer wanted to show that because of a usage of trade (and additional
agreed terms), neither price nor quantity was "mandatory. '4 6 The buyer
was met with the parol evidence rule4 7 and a clause stating that "[n]o
conditions which are not incorporated in this contract will be
recognized. '48
The court had "grave doubts" about applying Columbia Nitrogen to
different facts.49 The court anticipated evidence that contracts in the
trade were not strictly enforced by the parties. It understood the reasons:
"Lawsuits ... do not facilitate good business relations with customers." 50
A contracting party may prefer to renegotiate "rather than rest on its
strict legal rights. Yet, the supplier or purchaser knows that he may resort
39. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 794-805 (1999). For a discussion and critique of Professor Ben-
Shahar's approach, see Ian Ayres, Eroding Entitlements as Litigation Commitment, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 836 (1999).
40. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 39, at 806-18; Omri Ben-Shahar, The Erosion of Rights
by Past Breach, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190, 215 (1999) [hereinafter Erosion].
41. See Erosion, supra note 40, at 228-29. The example that Professor Ben-Shahar
gives is outside the scope of the UCC. The analysis can apply just as well in the context of
the Code, however. Imagine a debtor who, in a complex security agreement, has agreed
not to grant junior security interests. The debtor may nevertheless do so, perhaps with the
acquiescence of the secured party. If the debtor thereby obtains credit and makes invest-
ments that increase the social pie, value has been created. This result is encouraged by the
Code regime (which Professor Ben-Shahar would refer to as "erosion rules"). For a differ-
ent justification of waiver and estoppel in this context, see Snyder, supra note 18, at 660-62
& n.252.
42. See Bernstein, supra note 34; see also Scott, supra note 9, at 861 (envisioning "that
every relational norm be judicialized," apparently as a result of the incorporation
approach).
43. 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978).
44. Id. at 582.
45. Columbia Nitrogen v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
46. Southern Concrete, 407 F. Supp. at 582-83.
47. See U.C.C. § 2-202.
48. Southern Concrete, 407 F. Supp. at 582-83.
49. Id. at 583.
50. Id. at 584.
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to those enforceable contract rights if necessary." 51 The court under-
stood that the buyer sought to introduce evidence of relationship-preserv-
ing conduct when only the end-game terms were relevant. 52
Other courts have reached similar decisions,53 and there is no reason to
think that courts are particularly error-prone in this regard. The contrary
argument has been made: without incorporation, Professors Kraus and
Walt say,
[t]he only possible source of interpretive error is a misinterpretation
of the plain meaning by contractors and judges. Under an incorpora-
tion regime, however, contractors and judges can mistakenly identify
the domain for which a term's meaning is determined, in addition
.... Because the two types of mistakes are not correlated, incorpora-
tion regimes would be expected to have a higher rate of interpretive
error .... 54
How this argument works is unclear, however. Suppose a nonlawyer
reader is asked the meaning of the following sentence, found in a judicial
opinion: "With a few exceptions, binding contracts require considera-
tion." The plain meaning to the untrained reader would be, "With a few
exceptions, binding contracts require the parties to think about what they
are doing."'55 If we allow the reader to ask a lawyer the meaning of "con-
sideration," the chance of misinterpretation should be diminished. True,
the reader might instead choose to ask a priest or a philosopher or a bus
driver, and doing so might increase the chance of misinterpretation. But
the risk of going the wrong route does not necessarily outweigh the bene-
fit of allowing the reader to go the right route.56
Of course, a court must inquire into the nature of the customs being
asserted. 57 The inquiry may be complex, requiring the court to deter-
mine, perhaps, what the relevant trade and transaction are before it can
decide what customs are relevant. 58 But the context should help fix the
51. Id.
52. Notably, the court did not evince any hostility to the Code regime; the opinion
extols custom as "an important aid in the interpretation of the terms of a contract." The
court feared that extending Columbia Nitrogen would only lead to boilerplate exclusions of
such evidence, as well as the undermining of contracts. See id.
53. See United States v. Grayson, 879 F.2d 620, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.)
(refusing to enforce lenient collection policy where parties failed to agree on written pay-
ment deferral); State ex rel. Nichols Mach. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 671 P.2d 1151, 1154-55
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 22, § 3-3 (collecting and explaining
authorities).
54. Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 198; see also id. at 24-36; Clayton P. Gillette,
Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 173, 183
(1993).
55. See infra Part III.A.2 (defining "plain meaning").
56. Compare Scott, supra note 9, at 860 & n.34; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 34,
at 283-86.
57. See Gillette, supra note 54, at 183.
58. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 757 n.187; Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs
Exist?, in KRAUS & WALT, supra note 37, at 121-25; Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and
Stasis in Trade Usages in International Sales, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 707, 718-20 (1999).
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meaning of the agreement, 59 and at least some courts have shown that
they will look into context quite carefully, being sure not to extend a
practice into a context where it does not belong.60 Judicial error is cer-
tainly possible, but it has not been shown that courts err more under the
incorporation regime than a different interpretive regime. 61
The problem of opportunism is another reason to permit courts to at-
tend to parties' unwritten norms. 62 Suppose the parties to a feed contract
are in relationship-preserving mode. The written agreement requires that
the weight of the delivered feed be certified by a federal agent, but feed
sellers rarely go to the trouble, and buyers rarely object. 63 This particular
buyer and seller have foregone federally supervised weights for a number
of previous contracts. Then the market shifts and prices fall. The buyer,
after a delivery without the required certification, declares a breach and
obtains the feed from another seller at the (now much lower) market
price. Under the neoformalist regime, the buyer would win. Professor
Bernstein's approach exalts the written term into the only relevant term.
It is not. The relationship-preserving norms are relevant because the par-
ties (or at least the seller, so far as it knew) were still in relationship-
preserving mode.64 The neoformalist result would surprise both parties
and would be inconsistent with their manifested assent.
B. THE NONEXISTENCE ARGUMENT AND THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH So FAR
Another critique of incorporation questions whether industry customs
actually exist, arguing that merchants do not agree on the meaning of
trading terms or practices.65 The argument is based on Professor Bern-
stein's examination of early twentieth-century efforts in certain trade
groups to codify their customs. 66 Customs often did not spread across the
nation, she finds, and the customs of one locale sometimes conflicted with
59. Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 235, 277 (1993). Patterson makes the argument in a hypothetical
opinion replacing Judge Kozinski's in Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, the implication is that Professor Patterson
believes this to be true too. Dean Scott agrees that "contractual context may frequently be
useful in clarifying meaning," supra note 9, at 857, although in the end he focuses more on
its dangers, see supra note 56. See also infra note 140 and accompanying text.
60. See H&W Indus. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 911 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1990) (assert-
ing trade usage inapplicable because of duration of contract and state of market).
61. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 37, at 780 (stating only the surmise that "third-party ap-
plication of these types of customs may well be error prone").
62. See Charny, supra note 33, at 853; see also Gillette, supra note 58, at 717.
63. The example is adapted from Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1793.
64. See Charny, supra note 33, at 853.
65. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 715, 721. Richard Craswell advances a related
critique, arguing that "the existence (and identification) of customs" are influenced by "the
goals, beliefs and other normative premises of the person doing the identifying." Craswell,
supra note 58, at 118-19. Professor Craswell's ideas are addressed carefully in Kraus &
Walt, supra note 37, at 203-07, and their debate will not be repeated here. Professor Cras-
well's essential argument is acknowledged infra notes 171 to 173 and accompanying text.
66. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 715.
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those of another. 67
This research and Professor Bernstein's assessment of it offer new per-
spectives. On the other hand, a number of responses are possible,68 and
some scholars have already presented opposing evidence from the inter-
national context.69 In addition, there is the problem of extrapolating
from codification debates that took place in the first decade or two of the
last century.70 Plus, the evidence discloses plenty of customary usage
within a locale, and in a dispute between two local merchants, the Code
conception would often work just fine.71 Moreover, the arguments about
custom that Professor Bernstein discusses show primarily that merchants
disagreed about the precise meaning of terms, but there was also some
common ground.72 Perhaps one would find disagreement about whether
hay with twenty percent clover qualifies as "No. 1 hay," but there seems
to be no question that pure timothy would indeed constitute "No. 1
hay."'73 Customs, like language, can be less than fully determinate; it does
not follow that they are indeterminate or nonexistent. 74
In addition, the evidence that Professor Bernstein uses suffers an inher-
ent problem: a codification effort, and the debate inevitable in such a
move, seems likely to highlight the grounds of disagreement. 75 The
troublesome areas that require investigation, debate, and decision will be
the focus. The finding that merchants vehemently debate the meaning of
various terms does not compel the conclusion that Llewellyn's conception
of custom is unworkable.
Similarly, arbitrators' pronouncements, which Professor Bernstein em-
phasizes, suffer from inherent biases. Their assertions that they do not
67. See id. at 715-21.
68. Some responses have now been published. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Relational
Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa
Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 775, 784-800 (2000); Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping
the Promise of Relational Contract Theory-"Real" Legal Language and a New Legal Real-
ism, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 909, 926-29 (2000).
69. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (2000); Gillette, supra note
58, at 710 n.10.
70. Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 202.
71. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 753 n.173 ("[Iln the early years more trade was
local in scope, so those local customs that did exist may have been a sound basis for decid-
ing cases."); see also Epstein, supra note 37, at 824 ("[V]ariation among customs only cre-
ates genuine friction when the transactions take place between members of two different
communities."); Macaulay, supra note 68, at 788-89.
72. The Code contemplated that this situation would arise. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 9;
see also Gillette, supra note 58, at 716-21; Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 202.
73. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 720-21 (using the terms "No. 1 hay," "clover," and
"pure timothy" in her discussion of trade usage).
74. For similar arguments in the context of language in public law, see Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 430 (1985) (constitutional language estab-
lishes "a frame with fuzzy edges" which may still "tell us when we have gone outside it");
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 462, 473 (1987) (distinguishing indeterminate from underdeterminate).
75. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 37, at 740-41 ("[D]ebates provided an opportunity for
rent-seeking subgroups to fabricate disputes about the content of custom and to lobby for
the recognition of the trade practices most favorable to them.").
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resort to custom 76 may not be accurate. Since they are merchant arbitra-
tors, operating within the same community as the disputants, they likely
use customary understandings of terms in resolving disputes without real-
izing it.77 For a merchant arbitrator, deciding that pure timothy consti-
tutes No. 1 hay may not seem like a resort to custom; it is too obvious.
By contrast, a law-trained judge will have to resort to extrinsic evidence,
and will have to do so consciously.
Another bias of arbitrators' pronouncements is shown by their exhorta-
tions to make contracts more definite. These appeals for more specific
contracts do not mean that no useful commercial standards exist. Parties
can always make their contracts less vague, and someone deciding a dis-
pute is likely to scold the parties for their inattention. But it does not
follow that the dispute is therefore undecidable for lack of any useful
standard.
Finally, the nonexistence argument can go only so far. Professor Bern-
stein does not deny the existence of any customs, and her research would
not support such a claim.78 The Code does not require the use of custom
where there is no practice "having such regularity of observance ... as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed. '79 The UCC approach
does not assume that there must be "widely known commercial standards
and usages that are geographically coextensive with the scope of trade,"
as Professor Bernstein argues.80 Indeed, many customs may not meet the
definition in the Code, 81 and many contracts will lack any course of deal-
ing or course of performance. In such cases, there is no information to
supplement the express terms of the contract. The existence of such situ-
ations, however, does not mean that courts should blind themselves to the
information where it does exist. And sometimes it does exist, even ac-
cording to Professor Bernstein's evidence.
C. Is COMMERCIAL CUSTOM INEFFICIENT?
One of the arguments against incorporating custom and conduct is cen-
tered on their possible lack of efficiency. A group of articles discusses the
possible inefficiency of commercial customs, and whether they are better
than state-created norms. Eric Posner discusses many reasons that com-
mercial customs may be inefficient. 82 Customs may result from idiosyn-
76. See id. at 770.
77. Cf. Craswell, supra note 58, at 135-38; Charny, supra note 33, at 848.
78. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 715, 770-72; Gillette, supra note 58, at 710; Macau-
lay, supra note 68, at 787; Mertz, supra note 68, at 929-30.
79. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2); Macaulay, supra note 68, at 788.
80. Bernstein, supra note 37, at 777.
81. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2); see also Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 222.
82. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697 (1996); see also Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Network Exter-
nalities, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting ("or the Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L.
REV. 713 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997).
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cratic facts, path dependence, or information cascades. They may suffer a
bias for the status quo or for conformity. They may be influenced by
other factors unrelated to efficiency. 83 Customs may favor stronger par-
ties or particular types of firms, 84 and some customs may represent prac-
tices that many want to change.85
The economic literature is ambivalent, however. Some have responded
with arguments that can be deployed in defense of incorporation. One
version is a sort of minimalist approach that suggests that commercial
customs are suboptimal but are better in general than either individual
decisions or legislated rules.8 6 Another economic response is almost
amusing in its irony. Simply put, the argument goes: Some commercial
norms are inefficient. They therefore operate as "penalty default" rules,
penalizing parties who do not displace them. Parties are thus given an
incentive to adopt by express provision a better rule instead of being
stuck with the penalty default. Adopting an express provision necessarily
reveals information to the other side (and to the courts). At least argua-
bly, the law should give parties an incentive to reveal information. 87 Yet
another economic view suggests that in certain circumstances-particu-
larly involving international transactions-evolved customs are more
likely to be efficient. 88
This research is illuminating, but from the standpoint of assent it is be-
side the point. In assent-based construction, the law should give effect to
83. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 754 (citing David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading
the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, reprinted in MARIANO TOM-
MASI & KATHRYN I. IERULLI, THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 191
(1995)); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996);
Gillette, supra note 58, at 712 nn.16-17 (collecting authorities on network effects).
84. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 749; Danzig, supra note 12.
85. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 752.
86. See Kraus, supra note 82 (defending incorporation in general but hoping to en-
hance the efficiency of selected commercial practices); see also Alan Schwartz, The Default
Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1993) (dis-
cussing the difficulty of legislating satisfactory default rules through contract law).
87. The pioneering piece on penalty default rules is Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Fill-
ing Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
91 (1989). For further economic discussion and debate, see Ian Ayres, Preliminary
Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. REV. 1
(1993); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell,
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory
Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. PUB.
POL'Y 639 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of De-
fault Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990); Jason S. Johnston, Strategic
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990);
Scott, supra note 34; see also Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993).
88. See Gillette, supra note 54, at 187. See generally Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and
the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215
(1994); Gillette, supra note 58.
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what the parties have agreed, efficiency notwithstanding.89 If there is an
applicable usage of trade-"having such regularity of observance... as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transac-
tion in question" 90-then the parties should not be surprised with some
other rule that is arguably more efficient. Nor should a court substitute
its view of an efficient rule with a rule chosen by the parties.
Moreover, even if particular customs are inefficient, judicial interven-
tion is not likely to be an effective remedy. Court decisions, in the tradi-
tion of the common law, are unsystematic. Cases come up for appellate
decision (or fail to come up) by happenstance. Judicial opinions cannot
be expected to yield systematic norms for an industry, much less efficient
ones. Trade associations, comprised of experienced market transactors,
are better suited to generate systematic and efficient customs.91 The state
is ill suited for such a task.92
D. ENCRUSTATION
More than fifteen years ago Charles Goetz and Robert Scott argued
that the incorporation strategy tends to solidify commercial practice so
that innovation becomes more difficult and "encrustation" results.93 This
can partly be seen as a consequence of path dependence and the status
quo bias.94 Lawyers might best understand it as an issue of precedent: as
courts follow decided cases about commercial practice, the findings of
earlier decisions can become encrusted.95 Later cases hesitate to stray
from precedents, even if they are couched in terms of fact rather than
law,96 and even if they are outmoded.
As with all of the critiques of incorporation, there is real weight to
these arguments. A tentative response is possible, however. Dean Scott
advances another critique of incorporation that is in tension with the en-
crustation objection. In a recent publication on this subject, he argues
89. Contracting parties need not confine themselves to what an economic analyst finds
efficient or rational, and there may be a non-economic reason that a party has acted "irra-
tionally." See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of
Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 115, 133-39 (1993); cf. Coleman et al., supra note 87, at
639 (exploring types of rationality aside from maximizing joint outcomes). Efficiency is
not completely irrelevant, however, at least on some theories of assent. See Randy E.
Barnett,... and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 421,430-31 (1993) [herein-
after and Consent]; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 907-09 (1992) [hereinafter Silence].
90. U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
91. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 757 n.186.
92. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 392.
93. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 34, at 288-305; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In
Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998); Gillette, supra note 58, at 721-32;
Kraus, supra note 82.
94. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 COR-
NELL L. REV. 608 (1998). See supra notes 82 to 83.
95. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract In-
terpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1859 nn.149-150 (1991).
96. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) ("The existence and scope of such usage are to be proved as
facts.").
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that "the fact-specific nature of the contract dispute leaves, in virtually
every case, little opportunity for subsequent incorporation of interpreta-
tions as default terms suitable for other contracting parties. ' 97 If this is
the case, then it is difficult to see how encrustation would present any
practical difficulties. Moreover, if the judicial decisions are as various
and unpredictable as Dean Scott suggests, 98 encrustation would not seem
to be a problem. 99
III. CUSTOM AS LANGUAGE AND PERFORMANCE
AS FORMALITY
A. INTRODUCTORY NoTEs
Before advancing into the heart of the argument, a few assumptions
need to be stated and explained, if not justified. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to make those assumptions clear and to disclose some of the ideas
behind the assumptions. These ideas no doubt color the argument, so an
attempt at disclosure seems worthwhile.
1. Assent as a Basis for Legal Liability
Assent as a basis for legal obligation is a large subject that is outside
the scope of the present inquiry, which is focused on the role of custom
and conduct in contract interpretation and construction. This Article sim-
ply assumes assent to be the basis of contractual liability, and hence the
proper concept on which to build an interpretive or constructive regime.
The explanation for this assumption is bottomed on tradition.
Assent and consideration are the traditional grounds for finding con-
tractual liability. This Article, which concentrates on commercial law,
disregards the consideration element because it is generally present in
commercial transactions.100 Since consideration cannot help to test the
role of custom and conduct, that leaves assent as the remaining tradi-
tional ground. It is possible to question (or defend) assent and considera-
tion, but that project is left to other articles. That assent is a traditional
basis of ordinary contractual liability is relatively uncontroversial,101 and
97. Scott, supra note 9, at 868; see Scott, supra note 38, at 166; see also Gillette, supra
note 58, at 732-40 (stating that encrustation through court decision "will still fail to
threaten the vitality of custom if judicial intervention is sufficiently rare").
98. See Scott, supra note 38, at 22-24.
99. Dean Scott is writing on a broader topic than mere incorporation of usage of trade,
course of dealing, and course of performance. Interestingly, he sees little use of these
criteria in the case law. See id. at 25-27.
100. Consideration can cause difficulties in the context of contract modification, but
that subject is treated elsewhere. See Snyder, supra note 18.
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (stating that with a
few exceptions, "a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange and a consideration"); see also U.C.C. § 2-204 (using the term
"agreement" instead of "mutual assent").
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assent remains quite viable today.102
I have started with tradition in this brief explanation in an attempt to
avoid the divisiveness that a deep theory can bring. As Cass Sunstein has
pointed out, people who may disagree on theoretical grounds may none-
theless reach some agreement, "incompletely theorized" though it may
be. 103 Thus, "assent" is the designated norm for this Article, following
generations of learning in contract law. As the norm is used here, it is
roughly congruent with the essential ideas of Charles Fried's "promise"
theory' 0 4 or Randy Barnett's "consent" theory, 10 5 but one need not buy
into those thickly theorized views, or their philosophical and political im-
plications.10 6 The argument here is just as congruent with a typical legal
argument built on the rules in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.0 7
Rather than relying on a particular theory of assent, the argument seeks
to include all those who are not ready to jettison assent from the
calculus. 08
As used here, then, "assent" is purposefully vague. The term does
need to carry some content, however. The first step is to determine what
assent can be fairly attributed to the parties. The ultimate goal of an as-
sent theory, as used here, is to find out their subjective intent. That goal,
however, must be tempered by practicality. A workable system requires
a third party (such as a judge or arbitrator) to determine the parties' as-
sent. Ordinarily, assent is attributed to the parties based on their "mani-
festation[s]" of assent, viewed objectively. 109 The objective theory is
necessary for a reliable system, but the point is to come as close as is
practical to the parties' subjective agreement. 1 0 This is the view of "as-
sent" used here.
102. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under
the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 895
(1987).
103. See Cass R. Sunstein, From Consumer Sovereignty to Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Incompletely Theorized Agreement, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 205 (1999).
104. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRAC-
TUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
105. See Silence, supra note 89, at 876-82.
106. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986). But see Jean Braucher, Contract versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, De-
fault Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
107. For such a Restatement-style argument, see Patterson, supra note 59, at 245-49.
108. The law may decide to remove assent from the calculus in particular cases, as with
contracts in restraint of trade (not to mention contract murder). See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-188 (1981); Richard Craswell, Default Rules, Efficiency, and
Prudence, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 289, 299-301 (1993). Such issues are beyond the scope
of this Article.
109. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981). Even the strongest
current consent theorists in contract recognize the objective theory of assent. See Silence,
supra note 89, at 857-59.
110. For an example of subjective assent replacing objective assent in a situation where
reliability concerns can be allayed, consider two parties who share the same subjective
assent, even though their objective manifestations indicate otherwise. In such a case, the
parties' subjective agreement governs. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 201(1).
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The law, of course, could deem assent for any number of reasons unre-
lated to the parties' own manifestations of assent. For example, the par-
ties might be deemed to assent to the most efficient term,111 or the term
that will generate an immanent commercial law. 112 They might be
deemed to have reached an agreement that will help produce a useful
menu of standardized terms, or a neat set of uniform default rules.113
These goals have been advanced by some of the scholars discussed in Part
II. On the assumptions adopted here, however, such "deemed" assent is
not fairly attributed to the parties. These methods of contract construc-
tion deviate from the principal goal, which is to approach as nearly as
possible to subjective assent, within the confines of a workable system.
The primary question for this Article is whether a system based on as-
sent can follow the neoformalists' suggestions and ignore custom and
conduct. Here, the question is answered in the negative. In a sense, the
issue is framed by the debate on the parol evidence rule. Chief Justice
Traynor famously thought written words inadequate to arrive at the par-
ties' assent, preferring to allow a writing that was clear to the trial judge
to be supplemented with parol evidence.114 Judge Kozinski responds
(from the next generation) that a surer way to discern the parties' intent
is to rely on the clear and carefully lawyered writing rather than on ex-
trinsic evidence.115 This Article seeks to contribute to that debate. It
argues that the regime for interpreting and construing contracts must
take account of custom and conduct, or else risk subordinating assent to
some other goal. At the same time, the Article suggests limits for custom
and conduct, realizing that sometimes they must give way to the parties'
other manifestations of assent.
2. Meaning
This is no more the place for an exploration of meaning and its possibil-
ity than it is for an exploration of assent or the underlying theory of con-
tract law. There can be (and has been) much debate about whether
111. See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law
of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989) ("[W]hat rational parties would have agreed to
is . . . evidence of what these parties did, in fact, agree to where there is silence or ambigu-
ity."); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Looking for Default Rule Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places, 3
S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 189, 192, 202-07 (1993) (arguing that efficiency leads to a finding of
consent).
112. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV.
873, 903-04 (1939); Danzig, supra note 12, at 627-31.
113. See Scott, supra note 9, at 866-69; Scott, supra note 38, at 150, 11-13; Goetz &
Scott, supra note 34, at 308-09.
114. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968).
115. See Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We
question whether [Chief Justice Traynor's] approach is more likely to divulge the original
intention of the parties than reliance on the seemingly clear words they agreed upon at the
time.").
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language can have a "plain meaning"11 6 or even any meaning at all.117
This is ground on which the present author fears to tread, and indeed
finds himself uncomfortably close. Still, some assumptions ought to be
made explicit because they underlie the following analysis.
This Article takes the view that language sometimes has a "plain mean-
ing," defined here as the meaning conveyed to the relevant audience if
the meaning (in the eyes of that audience) is clear and unambiguous.
Even if the language does have a plain meaning, however, the plain
meaning may vary from the meaning most closely associated with the as-
sent of the parties. This is most likely to happen when the relevant audi-
ence (say, a judge) is not a member of the same community of
discourse'1 8 as the speakers (the contracting parties).
Sometimes proponents of a plain-meaning approach underplay the im-
portance of perspective. One can emphasize the idea of enforcing the
plain meaning of terms, "as written."'1 9 From the standpoint of assent-
based interpretation, this approach is seductive. What could be better
than following the assenting parties' own instructions, "as written"? The
problem is that a court using a plain meaning rule necessarily decides
what the plain meaning is, "as read." The plain meaning to the judge may
well be different than the meaning of the parties. There is no opportunity
to correct this discrepancy under the plain meaning rule, which forbids
recourse to extrinsic evidence.' 20 This result is inconsistent with assent-
based interpretation.
An example may clarify the point. We may imagine an instance where
"70,000 cubic yards of cement"121 has the plain meaning to a judge of
precisely 70,000 cubic yards of cement, while the parties that used such a
quantity term in their contract assented to a sale of 70,000 cubic yards,
give or take 5000. This Article chooses the meaning that is closer to the
parties' assent. The Article rejects the idea that language has no meaning
that can be ascertained, although it admits that mistakes in interpretation
are perfectly possible. To put it succinctly, this Article takes the view (1)
that there is sometimes a plain meaning, (2) that courts should not be
constrained exclusively to plain meaning, and (3) that there is such a
thing as meaning (not necessarily plain to the relevant audience, i.e., the
judge) which is useful in deciding many contract disputes.
116. Rather than a lengthy list of citations to literary and interpretive theorists, perhaps
a reader will prefer this quotation: "The notion that the plain meaning of the words of a
statute defines the meaning of the statute reminds one of T.H. Huxley's gay observation
that at times 'a theory survives long after its brains are knocked out."' Mass. Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128, 138 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
117. See Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 227 n.4 (collecting authorities).
118. See infra Part IV.B.
119. The quotations refer to a hypothetical argument.
120. See Scott, supra note 38, at 162. As a doctrinal matter, this approach relies on a
robust parol evidence rule, along with a strict plain meaning rule. See Goetz & Scott, supra
note 34, at 311-16; Scott, supra note 38, at 162-63.
121. The example is adapted from Southern Concrete Services v. Mableton Contractors,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 582 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978).
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3. Default Rules Analysis
Some mention of "default rules analysis" seems required, not only be-
cause of the enormous (and inescapable) literature on the subject, 122 but
particularly because custom and conduct become part of the agree-
ment 123 unless "negated" by the parties. 124 As custom and conduct can
be displaced if the parties reach an express agreement to do so, custom
and conduct are "default rules,"'125 as opposed to "mandatory" or "immu-
table" rules. Custom and conduct do not fit easily into the usual default
rules analysis, however. Much default rules analysis revolves around the
questions, "[S]hould the law seek to complete the contract for the par-
ties? And if so, from what vantage point should the contractual gaps be
filled?' 1 26 Custom and conduct, as understood in this Article, are not the
sort of default rules that "complete" the parties' agreement, filling in
gaps. Custom and conduct tell us what the agreement contains. Only
after custom and conduct have been put to use do we know what the
parties have provided for, and what they have not.
This point can be made easily in the abstract; it becomes more complex
as it becomes more concrete. The effort shows, however, why default
rules analysis does not work very well for custom and conduct. First con-
sider two typical default rules.127 (1) Courts should fill a price gap with a
"reasonable price at the time for delivery . . . if nothing is said as to
price.'1 2 8 (2) If there is no delivery term, "the place for delivery of goods
is the seller's place of business or if he has none his residence.' 2 9 As
long as the parties set the price and the place for delivery, these default
rules will have no effect. They go away easily.
Custom and conduct are stickier. As custom and conduct are part of
the agreement not only by the fiat of the UCC definition but also as a
practical matter, the parties will have a rough time banishing them gener-
ally. If the parties call for a delivery of 100 loads of lettuce and include a
boilerplate clause that "usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
performance shall not be used to interpret the agreement," it is hard to
understand how a court could decide the quantity of lettuce specified in
the contract. (Apparently, a load of lettuce consists of forty bins, each of
which weighs 1000-1200 pounds, so a "load" is 40,000 to 48,000
pounds.) 130 The parties could state in their agreement that a load of let-
122. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 87. For a listing of representative articles, see
Scott, supra note 9, at 849 n.3.
123. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-208.
124. See id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
125. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. IN-
TERDISC. L.J. 29, 29 (1993).
126. Scott, supra note 9, at 847.
127. There are at least six different kinds of default rules, but the text treats only the
most basic. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 390-92.
128. U.C.C. § 2-305.
129. Id. § 2-308.
130. See KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
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tuce "must weigh 50,000 pounds or more (not less), any custom to the
contrary notwithstanding." If that is what the parties want, such a clause
ought to work. But such clauses require some specificity and care.
If the situation is sticky in the preceding example, involving a usage of
trade, it is even stickier when the parties' own conduct is brought in, as it
is through course of dealing or course of performance. Insofar as their
conduct is a manifestation of assent, it becomes part of their agreement
both by default, and by agreement. The parties can try to shut out their
conduct, both through general disclaimers as in the preceding example,
and by clauses that require modifications and waivers to be in writing.131
In addition, they may insert some more specific clause (e.g., "acceptance
of shipments weighing less than 50,000 pounds shall not bar any action by
buyer for breach, even if buyer accepts repeated shipments without ob-
jection"). But because the parties' own conduct is so much a part of the
relationship, and because reasonable reliance is possible, courts have
often been willing to estop a party whose conduct has given rise to rea-
sonable reliance by the other party. 132 We cannot quite say that conduct
constitutes some kind of immutable rule, because careful planning can
still displace it, but it does not fit well within the default rule paradigm
either. This Article therefore analyzes these issues differently (although
it does take up the issue of the "quasi-mandatory" nature of custom and
conduct below). 133
There is another reason custom and conduct do not fit easily into de-
fault rules analysis. Default rules need to be justified somehow, to the
extent that they are not part of the agreement of the parties. 134 Because
custom (as part of the parties' language) and conduct (as manifestations
of the parties themselves) become part of the parties' agreement, they tell
us "what the transactors have consented to."'1 35 They do not pose the same
problems of legitimacy and authority, since they are justified by
agreement. 136
B. CUSTOM AS LANGUAGE
Having established that the interpretive regime should be built on the
assent that can be fairly attributed to the parties, the parties' language is
the natural place to begin. The argument advanced here is that custom is
part of that language. 137 Understanding custom as language allows us to
131. U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
132. See id. § 2-209. For fuller treatment, see Snyder, supra note 18.
133. See infra notes 206 to 224 and accompanying text.
134. See Charny, supra note 95, at 1817.
135. Id. at 1835 (emphasis in original).
136. See also Burton, supra note 89, at 117 (stating that default rules that are not justi-
fied by agreement must be otherwise justified); Gillette, supra note 54, at 173 (trade usage
falls within the parties' mutual understanding). Compare Charny, supra note 95, at 1835
(focusing on the obligations to which transactors "would have consented").
137. To be clear, I certainly do not claim to be the first to see custom and language
together. Their relation to each other is intuitive; they are so close that the basic idea can
be asserted simply, without much elaboration or citation. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note
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see how custom can be as important as the words printed on the back of a
purchase order or on the face of a security agreement. When we see cus-
tom as language itself, we can be less worried about using particular cus-
tomary understandings to interpret words that appear to have a plain
meaning but that in fact carry latent messages as well.
In seeing custom as language, this Article follows Ludwig Wittgen-
stein's Philosophical Investigations.138 But the Article is not meant to be
about Wittgenstein or his philosophy. Rather, his thinking helps to shape
the argument. In addition, perhaps his rigor, and the work and care of his
followers, lend some authority to the propositions for which I argue.
Here, language is understood as a whole system of communication, in-
cluding verbal and nonverbal conduct. 139 Language as used here means a
"system of communication, ' 140 including verbal communication (consist-
ing of words) and nonverbal communication (e.g., shipping goods). Lan-
guage can do its job of communication because of conventions1 41 or
agreements1 42 as to the message to be taken from particular signs,143
68, at 786. My goal here is to make a careful argument from this intuition. Professor Cras-
well also analogizes trade custom and language, although in a different way and with dif-
ferent conclusions. See Craswell, supra note 58, at 129-35.
138. Mistrusting my own training, I follow a philosopher with considerable trepidation.
Cf. Jean C. Love, Legal Formalism from the Perspective of a Reasonable Law Professor, 16
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 627, 627 (1993) (limited "ability of the reasonable law professor to
comprehend abstract philosophical terms"). As Wittgenstein has so much to teach on this
subject, I seek to tap his work, but only to the extent it might help a lawyer, a judge, or "a
reasonable law professor." This Article attempts to avoid great questions of jurisprudence.
It tries not to discuss questions like the truth of legal propositions. Cf. DENNIS PATtER-
SON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996), discussed in Law, Truth, and Interpretation: A Symposium on
Dennis Patterson' Law and Truth, 50 SMU L. REV. 1721 (1997); George A. Martinez, The
New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 545, 547 (1996).
The Article tries to stay away from any general theory of meaning or interpretation. Read-
ers interested in larger questions of linguistics and philosophy, including the discussions
among Gadamer, Habermas, Geertz, and their followers, are referred to other writers.
Professor Patterson has written extensively on Wittgenstein, both with respect to law gen-
erally and commercial law in particular. See generally WrrTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THE-
ORY (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992), and more particularly PATTERSON, supra note 15.
For a wide-ranging discussion including many philosophical and linguistic schools of inter-
pretation, see the Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1995), and very recently the work of Mertz, supra note 68, and
Jonathan Yovel, What Is Contract Law "About"? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of
"Skeletal Promises," 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 937 (2000).
139. For an example in Wittgenstein of nonverbal conduct (pointing) as "a part of [a]
language-game," see LUDWIG WI'ITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 669 (re-
issued 2d ed., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1997) (Wittgenstein completed his work by 1949);
see also id. § 666. The argument here follows Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as reflected
in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. Note that the argument does not limit language
to that which can be taught through ostensive definition. Cf. Schauer, supra note 33, at
527-28, criticized by PATrERSON supra note 15, at 91-92 n.66.
140. Cf. WrrrGENSTEIN supra note 139, § 3 ("Augustine, we might say, does describe a
system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system.").
141. See id. § 355.
142. See id. § 242.
143. One might refer to the meaning of those signs; in more familiar language, we might
say that a particular word means this or that. I try to speak instead of the message associ-
ated with these signs. The word meaning carries two messages itself: intent and definition.
This point is important to Wittgenstein, because the two ideas are linked (inextricably, if I
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whether those signs be words or nonverbal conduct. Context often helps
clarify communications that would otherwise be ambiguous or that other-
wise would be understood differently, 144 again because of a shared under-
standing or convention regarding what the context signifies. Nonverbal
communication is often key to conveying important messages about other
communications. That is part of the idea behind formalities like the im-
pressed wax seal of ancient legal documents. The seal is itself a nonver-
bal communication that carries important messages.
Consider another example of nonverbal contractual communication: A
man shops regularly at the same haberdashery, buying clothes over the
years and being billed on account. One day (a casual day at the office) an
unexpected meeting requires him to get a tie in a hurry. He goes to the
shop and finds the staff occupied with other customers. He picks out a tie
himself. Holding it up, he catches the proprietor's eye. The proprietor
nods, and the customer walks out. The next month, the haberdashery
sends a bill, which the customer pays. 145 Until the bill arrives, the trans-
action has involved simple signs (lifting the tie, nodding, walking out) and
complex messages (Customer: I want to buy this tie, please bill me in the
usual way, and I will pay you, although if it is defective I would expect a
refund if I return it with a satisfactory explanation; Merchant: I accept all
of those terms and conditions and probably others, and I will bill you).
Until the bill arrives, the transaction is wordless. In all likelihood, this
system of communication will work just fine for this transaction, and
about as well as if the transaction had been filled with words. 146 Here,
the customer and the haberdasher have communicated with each other
by means of a language that does not always require words. That is the
first point: that language can usefully be conceived to include nonverbal
communications.
This conception of language is bolstered if we realize that "[1]anguage
is an instrument.' 1 47 It is a tool for accomplishing a purpose. If the pur-
pose is the sale of goods (say, a tie), nonverbal language may be a better
suited instrument than verbal language. Just as words are tools, 148 other
understand him correctly): what a word or other sign means (i.e., its definition in context)
depends on the speaker's meaning (i.e., the speaker's purpose or intention). See id. §§ 544-
545. Much of what Professor Patterson has written on Wittgenstein and contract construc-
tion has to do with this purposive approach to interpretation. See generally PATTERSON,
supra note 15, at 90-93. See also Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 543 (2000) (not-
ing that Llewellyn put his purposive approach in Article 1, although its impact is fading,
and it should be removed in the revision of Article 1). Professor Maggs excludes custom
and conduct from his discussion. See id. at 543 n.ll.
144. WITTENSTEIN, supra note 139, §§ 584, 591.
145. I am grateful to my colleague David B. Goshien for teaching me this illustration,
which I have adapted for present purposes. It is similar to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 4 illus. 2 (1981) (lifting an apple), which itself makes the point that the
promises that make up a contract may consist partly or entirely of nonverbal conduct.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. a ("Conduct may often
convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to a proposed promise.").
147. WTFnGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § 569.
148. See id. § 11.
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signs-nonverbal signs-are other tools. A carpenter who sets to work
on a project will use a variety of tools. A commercial transaction may
require a variety of tools, including different ways of communicating-
verbal communication and nonverbal communication.
The explanation so far only gives part of the argument, however. The
other part is that we can understand words only by understanding how
they are used-how players in the language-game (the users of the partic-
ular language) "act." '149 Mere "[e]xplanation" must "come to an end
somewhere. ' 150 Where explanation ends, what people do is what mat-
ters. A "whole language" consists not just of words and how they are
used, but how people react to those words, that is, what actions are per-
formed in relation to the use of the words.151 The same is true of commu-
nicative conduct other than words, such as pointing or the use of a color
sample to indicate the color of building materials being requested.152
This idea fits well within the interpretive system of the Code. It is at
the core of the first section of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.
It is also the first definition in section 1-205, which speaks of "conduct
between the parties ... which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct."'1 53 Perhaps Llewellyn's sources for the UCC were more
eccentric, 54 but in this regard he might as well have been reading
Wittgenstein, his contemporary. 155
With these ideas in mind, the next step is to consider how commercial
custom and conduct in the performance of a contract may be the type of
nonverbal conduct that comprises language. Commercial transactions
will involve the use of many words. A concrete transaction will help clar-
ify how parties to a contract are players in a language-game that includes
many instruments aside from words.
Take the sale of fifty bales of No. 1 hay to be delivered to the buyer on
June 1.156 The buyer places the order by filling out a form at the seller's
place of business. The only blanks the buyer completes call for a quantity
(fifty), a commodity (No. 1 hay), a date, and a signature. The back of the
149. Id. § 1 (emphasis in original).
150. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § 1.
151. See id. § 6 (emphasis in original). Cf. Charny, supra note 95, at 1857 (discussing
cases that investigate "parties' conduct in reference to particular language"). The point
made in the text is not the same as (or at least is more specific than) the general idea; at the
core of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, that the meaning of a word turns on how it is used
in the language (a question of "grammar"). See PATTERSON, supra note 15, at 67, 77 (quot-
ing WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § 43), 90-93; cf. Charny, supra note 95, at 1857 (distin-
guishing cases that turn on "how transactors in the trade ordinarily use a word" from those
that turn on "how the parties conduct themselves") (emphasis in original); PA=TERSON,
supra note 15, at 38-39.
152. See WrrGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § 8.
153. U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
154. See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewel-
lyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 156-59 (1987).
155. See PATT-ERSON, supra note 15, at 37-42. Note that I am not making the claim that
Llewellyn did read Wittgenstein.
156. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 720-21.
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form contains a number of boilerplate terms, such as an express warranty
of merchantability, a disclaimer of other warranties, an integration clause,
and a force majeure clause. It is not hard to see that all of these terms are
"express," being stated in words, and that the written form contract con-
sists of something that might usefully be called language.
Despite the integration clause, the agreement also consists of much
else. Suppose that stores of hay are kept in a shed or barn behind the
seller's main building. Buyers sometimes inspect the hay and other com-
modities kept back there, keeping an eye on quality and noting what has
come in, when, and perhaps from whom. Behind the building many con-
versations take place among farmers, ranchers, and others. They catch up
with each other, and with the merchant who owns the business, and with
the various traveling representatives selling feed supplements, seed,
animal health products, and so on. Wittgenstein might see this scene as a
"whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven,"
and he might call it a "language-game. 1' 57
The crucial point is that language and actions are woven together. We
are familiar with the legal idea that a sample-the hay that the merchant
points out to the buyer-"creates an express warranty that the whole of
the goods shall conform to the sample." 158 It is perhaps odd to call the
warranty express since "express" usually describes a contractual term that
is specified in words. But if the merchant points to where the No. 1 hay is
kept so the buyer can inspect it, and the buyer does inspect it and then
places his order, the warranty might as well have been stated in words.
Indeed, the chief difference between the warranty by sample and the war-
ranty by verbal affirmation is that inspection seems much more effective
than verbal description. It seems more just to hold the merchant to war-
ranty liability where he has invited the buyer to inspect the product as
when a merchant has described it verbally or otherwise (e.g., by a picture,
or in another context, by a diagrammatic drawing). 159 By the same to-
ken, the inspection is as effective to protect the merchant, through an
unspoken, unwritten disclaimer of warranty liability for any defects the
inspection should reveal. 60 The buyer could see that the No. 1 hay con-
tained ten percent clover, and he is no more justified in complaining
about a delivery containing ten percent clover than the seller would be in
delivering hay containing fifty percent clover.
157. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § 7; see also Yovel, supra note 138, at 937, 955.
The scene described is based on conversations with G. John Veta of Wyoming and with the
United Farmers Exchange Association of Ohio. I can make no empirical claim that the
scene is typical, but I have tried to make it realistic. The main exception is that the people
I spoke to do not use the term "No. 1 hay." The "No. 1 hay" term is used in the text for the
sake of argument.
158. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c) (emphasis added).
159. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § lI.iv. ("And why should such a picture be
only an imperfect rendering of the spoken doctrine? Why should it not do the same service
as the words? And it is the service which is the point.").
160. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
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Let us now widen the view. Consider the scene described above-the
farmers and ranchers and sales representatives all talking and doing busi-
ness and working at the merchant's place of business and in the commu-
nity. Many of them have bought or sold No. 1 hay. They have signed
similar orders-contracts-and saw fit to behave in certain ways in rela-
tion to those contracts. Their actions, as well as the words in the contract,
make up the language-game in which we are interested if we have to en-
force the contract. When another rancher ordered No. 1 hay, the
merchant delivered hay with five percent clover; yet another received
something between five and ten percent. Most received around ten per-
cent. None complained, either to the merchant or each other. The whole
of this contract consists of the words of the agreement and the actions
into which they are woven. 161 The agreement and the contract consist
not only of the words "No. 1 hay." The words alone are useless without
knowing how people act in relation to those words.
This is the way to understand usage of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance, which are labels that describe how people act in
certain situations, and in relation to certain words and other signs. When
the UCC defines the parties' "agreement" to include all three, as well as
the "express" terms,162 it is saying the same thing about contracts as
Wittgenstein says about a "whole language."' 63 The parties' course of
performance and course of dealing, and the way that similarly situated
players act in relation to the words or signs in question, are inseparable.
"It is most natural, and causes least confusion, to reckon [nonverbal signs,
i.e., color samples] among the instruments of language.' 64 Just as the
words and actions are woven together into language in general, words
and actions are woven together into the language of a contract. 165 Per-
haps it is possible to pull out a thread. But at best this will weaken the
fabric, and more likely, the whole will unravel.
Until this point, custom and conduct have been treated together. That
is appropriate to some extent, as they are the same in that the parties'
past conduct-their "course of dealing"-may function as custom does.
Their understanding is linked to practices, and thus their "previous con-
duct," to the extent it "establish[es] a common basis of understanding,"' 66
is a part of the fabric of the parties' language. If their assent is what the
courts aim to find out, what the parties have done in relation to previous
contracts tells the courts (not to mention the parties themselves) what
certain signs are taken to mean. In this way, we see that the parties'
course of dealing functions just as custom does, as part of the parties'
language, their system of communication.
161. See WITFGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § 7.
162. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
163. WITrrGENSTEIN, supra note 139, § 6.
164. Id. § 16.
165. See id. § 7.
166. U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
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Course of performance presents a weaker case. It differs from course
of dealing, which is part of the background in which the present contract
is made. Like custom, a course of dealing is part of the vast practical,
nonverbal dictionary to which the parties might have recourse when they
make the present contract. The same is not true of their course of per-
forming the present contract, however; what they have done in perform-
ing the contract could not have been part of the background in which
they made the contract, chronologically speaking.167 In that sense, the
course of performance is less solid proof of the parties' meaning at the
time of contract formation. On the other hand, it may still be relevant.
What the parties later do in performance may give clues to their earlier
meaning.
Course of performance, then, is ambiguous. Imagine a neophyte
rancher who orders No. 1 hay and receives a delivery that is ten percent
clover.168 He may be surprised. On the other hand, this post-contractual
conduct is not without significance. The neophyte rancher after the deliv-
ery may think, "No. 1 hay contains clover, at least from this seller." The
seller's conduct-delivery-informs the rancher (and potentially, a court)
of what the seller apparently meant by "No. 1 hay." The information is
uncertain because it may simply constitute a breach by a corner-cutting
seller. But the delivery does give some information about the meaning of
"No. 1 hay" in the following sense: If the farmer receives another delivery
from another seller under another contract calling for No. 1 hay, the
meaning of "No. 1 hay" becomes more certain. With repetition the cer-
tainty increases. The evidence is not incontrovertible, and it is not direct.
But it is valuable information as the neophyte rancher learns a new lan-
guage-game. It is similarly valuable to a court, which is required to refe-
ree a language-game it has never seen.' 69 True, the value of the
information is undercut by its ambiguity. But if admissibility were limited
to unambiguous evidence, trials would be short indeed.
On this score, it is worth pointing out that if custom (putting aside
questions of course of performance) is understood as language, it comes
not only with the benefits of language but also its weaknesses. Few would
claim that language is perfectly precise. Past practice, while often suscep-
tible of reliable proof, may be distinguishable from the case at issue. A
practice that obtained in a sale of corporate jets might not obtain in a
case involving cargo planes.' 70 There will be questions of the extent and
application of a custom, as there are similar questions about words.
167. The problem of presentiation, and the work of Macneil and his followers, is partic-
ularly relevant to course of performance. See the works cited supra note 11.
168. See Charny, supra note 95, at 1862-63 (discussing the "neophyte rule").
169. Perhaps it is not wisest to have such inexperienced referees. Llewellyn proposed
merchant juries, but that move failed. See generally Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Lim-
its of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 65 (1987). The
parties cannot complain too loudly about the quality of judicial referee since they can al-
ways choose someone more expert by opting for arbitration. See infra Part IV.C.
170. See Craswell, supra note 58, at 121-25 & 144 n.23 (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 623 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1980)).
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There will be, to put it more philosophically, problems of induction, as
Wittgenstein taught. 71 In addition, the customs may be vague,172 just as
words may be vague. Understanding customs, like understanding lan-
guage, is a complex undertaking. Context, experience, and judgment are
necessary. 173 None of this is denied here. Custom is nevertheless useful,
as is language.
C. COURSE OF PERFORMANCE AS FORMALITY
The linguistic argument for course of performance is not as strong as
the argument for usage of trade and course of dealing. There is more to
the argument, however, than language. For course of performance, the
principal idea advanced here is that performance can be usefully under-
stood as a "natural formality,"'1 74 much like the delivery of a chattel that
makes effective an otherwise unenforceable promise to make a gift.175
The concept is not limited to the realm of donations; it obtains just as well
in the contractual paradigm, as where a seller delivers the goods being
sold.' 76 This section of the Article applies Fuller's analysis of legal for-
malities to course of performance, which is here conceived as a form. It is
perhaps most orderly to work through Fuller's now traditional list of the
three functions of formalities: evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling. 177
Course of performance is good evidence of what the terms of the con-
tract are considered to be by the parties, and that is precisely the goal of
assent-based construction. A contract calling for No. 1 hay may be
unintelligible to a court, which would somehow have to figure out
whether the hay could contain, say, five percent clover and still be classi-
fied as "No. 1 hay." It would surely be relevant to know, however, if the
seller had delivered ten installments with five percent clover and that the
buyer had paid for all of them, seemingly content. The evidence is ambig-
uous, as mentioned before; the seller may have breached and the buyer's
acceptance may represent only an effort to preserve the relationship. But
it does seem relevant in the sense that to a judge who is otherwise in the
171. WiITrENSTEIN, supra note 139, §§ 185-189, 198-201, cited in Craswell, supra note
58, at 144 n.15.
172. See Craswell, supra note 58, at 126.
173. See id. at 28-33 (discussing pragmatics as well as Stanley Fish). For a response to
Professor Craswell, see Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 203-07. See also supra note 65.
174. Fuller, supra note 8, at 815.
175. See id. at 805.
176. See id. at 815 (in the sale of a horse, "delivery and acceptance of the horse involve
a kind of natural formality, which satisfies the evidentiary, cautionary, and channelling
purposes of legal formalities"). What the parties do in performing the contract is not solely
formal, of course; "both a 'formal' and a 'substantive' aspect is apparent." Id. at 799.
177. See id. at 800-02. This Article does not attempt a complete discussion of legal
formalities. For views of particular interest, see Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-
An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931). For a more recent historical examina-
tion, see David Ibbetson, From Property to Contract: The Transformation of Sale in the
Middle Ages, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4-12 (1992). Regrettably, this Article was being revised
for the press when Duncan Kennedy's From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000), was
published, and I was unable to take full account of it.
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dark on the meaning of "No. 1 hay," such evidence makes it more likely
that No. 1 hay describes hay that includes five percent clover, especially if
corroborated by other evidence. 178
In assessing the value of this ambiguous evidence, it is helpful to com-
pare it to consideration, the legal form with which Fuller was concerned.
Actual performance would seem to be at least as good evidence as con-
sideration, and almost certainly better. With performance there has been
some execution. With consideration, there could be a mere allegation of
something entirely executory. 179 With course of performance, something
has happened. There may well be hard evidence, and even in the absence
of something physical, actual performance increases the likelihood of
other evidence: more witnesses, more testimony, perhaps shipping docu-
ments, or the like.
Course of performance also serves the cautionary function. There is a
"natural formality in the turning over of property or the rendition and
acceptance of services" or in the "surrender and acceptance of a tangible
benefit. ' 180 Plus, presuming the parties are interested in the performance
of the contract, and in their relationship, their performance is a matter of
importance to them. Whether they perform, how they perform, whether
there is acceptance or rejection-all of these things we can expect the
parties to a commercial contract to take seriously. A party who performs
over a period of time so that a meaningful course of performance is estab-
lished must know that its chance of future business, not to mention its
relations with the other party, depend on its performance. And as Judge
Posner has put it, actually doing something-here, performing-"makes
one put one's money where one's mouth is. ''18 1 On the other side, a party
who does not object to a course of performance (and a course of perform-
ance, by definition, requires that there be no objections after repeated
performances) 182 must figure that what it got this time it is likely to get
the next time, absent some objection. The taking of action in perform-
ance of the contract, and the repeated acceptance of those performances,
would seem an excellent "check against inconsiderate action."' 8 3
The channeling function, which "mark[s] or signalize[s]" what the par-
ties mean to be legally enforceable, 184 is also served by a course of per-
formance. Before going further, though, additional clarification is
necessary. The channeling function serves "to make sure that [the par-
ties] understood and could organize their behavior around a very clear
distinction between legally enforceable and unenforceable promises."'1 85
A formality shows what promises are within the channel of judicial cogni-
178. See supra text accompanying notes 168 to 169.
179. See Fuller, supra note 8, at 816-17.
180. Id. at 816-17.
181. Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 1986).
182. See U.C.C. § 2-208(1); 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 22, § 3-3.
183. Fuller, supra note 8, at 800.
184. Id. at 801.
185. Kennedy, supra note 177, at 102.
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zance and state enforceability, and which ones are left to the purely pri-
vate, moral realm. A legal formality, through the channeling function,
"effect[s] a categorization of transactions into legal and non-legal."'1 86
Admittedly, the channeling function is often understood otherwise, as a
means to channel people into particular behaviors (like writing down
contracts) that are thought to be desirable. 187 Although that view is con-
sistent with the arguments advanced here, it is not my reading of Fuller.
In what way, then, does course of performance furnish an assurance
that it is within the channel of legal transactions, or that it is an appropri-
ate "channel[ ] for the legally effective expression of intention"? 88 Most
obviously, the course of performance takes place within a channel that
has already been marked for the legal realm because it is by definition the
performance of a contract. The existence of the contract is itself one sig-
nal that a transaction with legal consequences is underway; that signal is
strengthened by the very act of performance. Any doubts that a legally
binding relationship existed are allayed by the actual performance of the
contract. In this way we can understand Fuller's argument that the deliv-
ery and acceptance of goods "involve a kind of natural formality, which
satisfies the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling purposes of legal
formalities. "189
As Fuller also observed, legal formalities have dangers. One who con-
ceives an objective may choose a legal form to achieve it, but if he is not
aware of all of the effects of that form, the objective may be endan-
gered.190 This again is an apt description of a course of performance. A
party who accepts a course of performance may not realize that the writ-
ten terms of the contract-the so-called "end-game norms"-may be un-
dermined by relationship-preserving conduct. 191 This of course raises an
issue, just as the seal raised an issue: Would the person who sealed a
specialty understand that he would give up even the defense of fraud? 192
Consideration runs into similar problems, but worse; many promises that
are supported by a bargain are nevertheless excluded from legal enforce-
ment because they are of a social, familial, or religious nature. The courts
have traditionally assumed those promises were not meant for legal en-
forcement, despite the presence of a bargain. 193 Rarely can a legal for-
mality distinguish perfectly between behavior that is meant to have legal
consequences from that which is not. Legal formalities are imperfect, and
these imperfections frequently lead to involved argument about the chan-
186. Fuller, supra note 8, at 803.
187. Teaching materials seem to emphasize this understanding. See, e.g., LYNN M.
LoPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 168 (3d ed.
2000) ("By refusing to enforce oral security agreements, the law encourages the parties to
put them in writing.").
188. Fuller, supra note 8, at 801.
189. Id. at 815.
190. See id. at 801-02.
191. See supra Part H.A.
192. See Fuller, supra note 8, at 802.
193. See cases cited in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.7 (3d ed. 1999).
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neling function. 194
Although it is as imperfect as other legal formalities, course of per-
formance does fulfill the channeling function in several ways. Putting
course of performance in the channel of legally effective transactions al-
lows courts to head off surprising opportunistic behavior to which the
parties have not assented.195 And if the relationship has in fact reached
the stage where the stricter end-game norms are relevant, the assertion
that a particular practice is only meant as a non-binding accommodation
may be credible or not, just as it may be true or not. To say that a course
of performance may be a relationship-preserving norm is not to say that it
must be. Nor is it clear why we should assume that courts are incapable
of distinguishing accommodations accepted while the relationship was
good from standards expected when the relationship has reverted to a
stricter mode.1 96
The cautionary and evidentiary characteristics of legal formalities
counsel against such an assumption. Certainly a party that continues to
accept a course of performance (i.e., a succession of performances), 197
and acquiesces to ten percent clover in each delivery, will realize as time
goes on that demanding hay with less clover will grow increasingly diffi-
cult, either practically or in litigation. A good way for the point to be
driven home to the buyer is that it keeps getting similar deliveries. These
should certainly serve as a due caution that continuing acquiescence will
lead to more of the same. The buyer might also suspect that repeated
acceptances without objection will give evidence that such deliveries were
acceptable, once a neutral (but not necessarily knowledgeable) third
party is called to look into a dispute. These aspects of the cautionary and
evidentiary functions suggest that the channeling function is also fulfilled
by the performance of a legally binding obligation: a judge should know,
and the parties should know, that their actions will be given legal
effect.198
The channeling argument, concededly, is the weakest for course of per-
formance. Visiting legal consequences on anything always comes with
certain costs. By allowing a course of performance to amount to a legally
enforceable promise, the law and its machinery come into the relation-
ship of the parties. In some ways, we may prefer to confine the law to the
written contract. Perhaps we feel safer without the law roaming through
a continuing relationship. To my mind, though, the case is relatively
weak. Such a principle would presumably be grounded on the idea, in
Fuller's words, that "[t]here is a real need for a field of human inter-
course freed from legal restraints, for a field where men may without lia-
bility withdraw assurances they have once given.' 99 But the justice of
194. See Fuller, supra note 8, at 800-03; Kennedy, supra note 177, at 102.
195. See supra notes 62 to 64 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 42 to 64 and accompanying text.
197. See U.C.C. § 2-208(1); 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 22, § 3-3, at 113.
198. See Fuller, supra note 8, at 801.
199. Fuller, supra note 8, at 813.
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that idea is considerably diminished when the parties are already within a
binding contractual relationship.200 This is a field where the dangers of
inconsiderate action, and legal liability, seem small.
We thus see that course of performance fulfills Fuller's three criteria of
legal formalities, and we can now better understand the significance of
course of performance. A legal formality, because it meets those criteria,
is an especially valuable form of expression from the perspective of the
law. In litigation, disputes can be settled with greater confidence. There
is more than a bare expression of assent. The manifested assent is bol-
stered by indications of considerate action, with the promise of better
proof, with less fear that the law is interfering where it ought to stay
away. From the perspective of contracting parties, legal formalities are
similarly valuable; the formalities give greater assurance that what the
parties have done will be taken seriously by a court. The evidentiary and
channeling functions reduce the chance that a court will misinterpret
what the parties mean, and what they mean to be bound to.
IV. LIMITS TO CUSTOM AND CONDUCT
The arguments advanced above come with inherent limits. To say that
custom is part of language and that a course of performance is a formality
shows how custom and conduct are useful in determining the parties' as-
sent. In general, though, commercial contracts will include other lan-
guage and other formalities. Many contracts will also include parties who
are not in the same community, and who may be playing different lan-
guage-games. These facts help set the bounds for custom and conduct.
A. CONFLICTING LANGUAGE, CONFLICTING FORMS
Deducing assent from custom and conduct is merely an exercise in
probability. How helpful custom and conduct are in arriving at the par-
ties' assent will be affected by what other language and what other forms
they have used. Using custom and conduct makes particular sense in the
absence of other information, as where the express terms leave an unam-
biguous gap. In that case a customary term-one that the parties expect
to be observed2ul-is probably better than no term (which would render
the contract unenforceable) or an arbitrary term.20 2 Either of the latter
holdings will result in one party winning for reasons that have nothing to
do with the parties' assent. The same analysis holds for a patent ambigu-
ity in the express terms. A term that is ambiguous is by definition un-
clear.20 3 So far as a court is concerned, that is almost as much of a gap as
200. See id. at 818 (quoting Llewellyn); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 89 cmt. a (1981).
201. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
202. Even Professor Bernstein would look to custom to fill an unambiguous gap. See
Bernstein, supra note 37, at 753, 757 & n.186.
203. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th ed. 1999).
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a gaping hole is. The court has to decide the meaning to use; it ought to
choose in a way that relates to the parties' assent.
What the neoformalists most dislike, I think, are two related aspects of
the Code regime: (1) the use of custom and conduct to interpret facially
unambiguous terms20 4 and (2) the difficulty of displacing custom and
conduct 20 5 (a difficulty which makes them "quasi-mandatory"). 20 6 These
objections raise most clearly the problem of apparently conflicting ex-
pressions; the parties may seem to be saying one thing in their written
agreement and doing another in practice. Even if we understand the
writing, custom, and conduct as manifestations of assent, the question re-
mains: Which expression should be given legal effect?
The clearest case for subordinating custom and conduct is a contract in
which the express, negotiated terms of a written and integrated agree-
ment carefully negate custom and conduct. In that situation, the writing,
through verbal language, expresses the parties' assent, and the agreement
also partakes of the formal aspects of a signed writing. Recall the clause,
discussed above, that would require deliveries of 50,000 pounds of let-
tuce, despite custom and conduct that would show that a load of lettuce is
40,000-48,000 pounds.20 7 The example demonstrates several points.
First, negation of usage of trade and course of dealing can be relatively
easy, although it does require attention. Such attention may at first seem
an unreasonable cost to impose on the parties, but it seems more reasona-
ble when we consider that the parties are asking the court to ignore a
convention. If the parties want their unconventional agreement to be
honored, some care on their part is necessary.
Second, the example shows how some trade usages, though hard to
state precisely, may still be displaced with relative ease (if the parties are
paying attention). It is not true, as has been asserted, that a custom that
cannot be formulated cannot be displaced. 20 8 There may be considerable
disagreement, for instance, on whether a "load" of lettuce is 40,000
pounds, 48,000 pounds, either, something in between, or something else
entirely. Yet an express contract term can specifically negate the custom-
ary term with one sentence. In such a case, it should be privileged over
considerations of custom and conduct; the parties have informed each
other and the court of which expression of assent to follow.
This example does not suggest, however, that written contract terms
should always be privileged over custom and conduct. A written express
term (which is express because stated in words, and formal because writ-
204. See supra notes 24 to 27 and accompanying text.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 126 to 129.
206. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 758.
207. See supra text accompanying note 126.
208. But see Bernstein, supra note 37, at 759-60 (citing U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2) ("[I]f
there are, in fact, customs that cannot be linguistically captured in a contract provision ex
ante, the incorporation strategy transforms them into mandatory terms because in order to
be excluded, the contract must negate them with specificity, something that by assumption
is not possible.").
[Vol. 54
2001]LANGUAGE & FORMALITIES IN COMM. CONTRACTS 649
ten) is a manifestation of assent that should carry legal significance. But
where the parties have used other language, and other formalities, the
written express term should sometimes give way. A written term may
appear, for instance, as boilerplate 20 9 in a software licensor's clickwrap
form; it may even be hidden inside a box, unknown to a buyer of goods
until the box is opened.21 0 These terms cannot be ignored. In each case,
there may be some manifestation of assent. In the clickwrap case, for
instance, suppose the licensor includes the term in the license agreement,
and the licensee's employee clicks "OK" in order to run the program that
the company had bought. Or the employee opened the box containing
the computer equipment, seeing that various terms appeared on the
boxtop.2 11 This is some evidence of assent, but it is doubtful. 21 2 Other
evidence of assent may be considerably stronger, and in some cases, the
stronger evidence of assent will be custom and conduct.
Admittedly, the approach to contract construction suggested here is
not cheap or easy. It requires courts to consider more evidence, not less.
There will be hard cases and no shining bright line. In a case like Colum-
bia Nitrogen, at least the judge will need to hear evidence of custom and
conduct, and some judges may go wrong while others go right.2 13 But the
possibility of error-which always exists-cannot justify a rejection of
custom and conduct, at the expense of the parties' assent.
An aficionado of efficiency might argue that the plain meaning of ver-
bal language is so plain, and thus so easy and inexpensive for courts to
follow, that the law should only enforce transactions that are expressed in
209. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 34, at 314-15 ("The lingering argument against a
strong plain-meaning presumption is that the interpreter must somehow distinguish be-
tween meaningful language and empty boilerplate.").
210. The possibility of a term becoming part of the contract when appearing in only one
party's form may be obviated in a battle of the forms governed by the revision of U.C.C.
§ 2-207, but it is currently possible, and will remain possible as long as a court holds § 2-207
inapplicable. See generally Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timber-
line Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting 7th Cir. rule), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 2000
WL 1372886 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 2000); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d 1110 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000) (adopting 7th Cir. rule but coming out opposite).
For scholarly discussion of these sorts of issues, see, e.g., Kastely, supra note 12, at 802-05;
Woodward, supra note 33.
211. See Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1991).
212. See generally James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1693 (2000).
213. Even though some may be distressed by Columbia Nitrogen v. Royster Co., 451
F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971), they should take comfort from H&W Industries, Inc, v. Occidental
Chemical Corp., 911 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1990) (asserting trade usage inapplicable because
of duration of contract and state of market), and Southern Concrete Services v. Mableton
Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 582 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1978). As for Columbia Nitrogen, it is impossible to tell from the reported decision what
the right result would be. Under the approach of this Article, a judge should hear the
proffered evidence. Even if the judge found that the practice of adjustment was not dis-
placed by the parties' written agreement, see 451 F.2d at 9-10 (because they disagreed, the
parties simply omitted the portion of the contract concerning adjustment for a declining
market), the practice should still be kept from the factfinder if it was an informal norm that
could be enforced only through nonlegal sanctions.
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words. This would parallel the idea that only contracts supported by con-
sideration, i.e., involving an exchange, are economically worth the trouble
and expense of enforcement. But this is a serious limit on freedom of
contract. Many transactions might fail the test. Is plain meaning a requi-
site of an enforceable contract? We might as well argue that only con-
tracts with a plain (or indisputable) meaning, derivable from an
unimpeachable writing, deserve legal enforcement. In any event, such a
regime would probably only shift the argument from (a) what is the
meaning of the communication, to (b) whether the communication is in-
disputably plain.
Another objection might draw a parallel to a different rule. Even if
custom and (at least some) conduct make up part of the language, con-
tract law often excludes some language from the consideration of the
factfinder. That is the whole point of the parol evidence rule,214 which
protects certain communications from being undermined: the parties
have made the choice, and gone to the trouble, of reducing at least part of
the contract to written form. That process requires some deliberation
and suggests that cautionary and channeling functions are fulfilled. The
parties have elected written words, with concomitant advantages in terms
of evidence and perhaps certainty. The parol evidence rule respects that
choice. The words of a written contract, the argument goes, are a surer
way to the communicated assent of the parties than a more free-ranging
inquiry, where sharp incentives color the memory.215
The same argument does not work as well for custom and conduct.
They are susceptible of more reliable proof compared to the parties' oral
communications or tacit assumptions. 216 Others, who are less interested
in the outcome, can testify to custom. We may also expect better evi-
dence when the operative question is, "What has been done?" rather
than, "What did he say?" or "What did he mean?" More witnesses are
likely, and physical evidence may even be available. A court need not
admit evidence to show "an oral declaration or even an agreement that
words in a dispositive instrument making sense as they stand should have
a different meaning from its common one .. . .[e.g., ] that when they
wrote five hundred feet it should mean one hundred inches. '217 If the
parties' own repeated performances show that "five hundred feet" to
them means "one hundred inches," or if the conduct of people in the
214. See, e.g., Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
215. See id. at 569.
216. See Charny, supra note 95, at 1859 n.149; Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 209-10.
Cf. Barnett, Silence, supra note 89, at 880 (resting his consent theory of default rules on
tacit assumptions and common-sense expectations); Craswell, The Relational Move: Some
Questions from Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 91, 111 (1993) (criticizing
use of tacit assumptions as being unsusceptible of reliable proof); Barnett, and Consent,
supra note 89, at 430 (arguing that tacit assumptions may be proved by course of dealing
and course of performance).
217. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 420 (1899).
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industry shows the same thing,2 18 then we fear less that a court will stum-
ble and credit evidence that ought not to be believed. 21 9 Moreover, it is
not at all clear that the custom or conduct, once proved, will have a less
certain meaning than the words used in the contract.
This point highlights an irony in the neoformalists' claim that the Code
transforms custom and conduct into quasi-mandatory terms.220 There,
the neoformalist argument depends on the failure of written words.221
The argument emphasizes the difficulty or impossibility of drafting ex-
press contract language that will successfully negate any relevant custom
or conduct.222 On the other hand, the neoformalist position advocates a
plain meaning approach to express contractual language,2 23 an approach
that depends on the efficacy of language.2 24 In the end, we cannot help
but rely on language, but we ought not to be too constrained in our view
of it.
B. COMMUNITIES OF CUSTOM
An assent-based justification for custom and conduct carries its own
limits. Customs apply within a community, like language. 225 The defini-
tions in the Code and the revision make this clear, 226 but its implications
should be made explicit. A court should not expect a usage of trade to be
followed if there are competing usages for the same kind of transaction
within the same community, as there could be no expectation as to which
one would be followed.2 27 A court should not expect a usage to be fol-
lowed if a member of the community contracts with someone outside the
community, particularly if the outsider has no reason to know of the in-
dustry customs. Under the current Code, the courts generally have not
218. Professor Macaulay gives the example of "two-by-fours." Apparently, they are 11h
by 3h inches. This fact can be proved with testimony from countless people in the trade,
not to mention actual two-by-fours, and birdfeeders made to be mounted on two-by-fours.
(Such birdfeeders would not fit on a board that was actually 2 by 4 inches.) See Macaulay,
supra note 68, at 787.
219. See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
§ 1-205:4, at 1-261 (responding to Holmes); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the
Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv.
533, 559-60 (1998).
220. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 758-60; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 34, at
286, 305 (explaining the difficulty of displacing implied terms).
221. See Scott, supra note 38, at 164.
222. Id. at 22.
223. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 756 & n.186 (apparently preferring to look to a
written contract provision rather than an unwritten custom, although this preference is not
clear); Scott, supra note 9; Scott, supra note 38.
224. See Mertz, supra note 68, at 927-28.
225. See Silence, supra note 89, at 882; see also Epstein, supra note 37, at 824.
226. "A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205(2). Revised U.C.C. § 1-303(c)
retains the wording.
227. On the other hand, if two customs are not entirely inconsistent, the court should
use the customs to the extent they overlap. For example, if some in the industry allow a
10% tolerance and others allow 15%, the court should allow 10% rather than zero. See
U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 9.
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had trouble confining usage of trade to those in the trade or those who
know or ought to know of the usage.228 There is no reason to expect that
courts will have trouble under the revision either, at least as a general
matter.
There is a troublesome exception, however, in Article 4. Section 4-103
visits on a bank customer all manner of banking rules and practices
"whether or not specifically assented to by all parties interested. '229 The
customer is thus deemed to assent to "Federal Reserve regulations and
operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like." The customer is
unlikely to know the contents of these obscure documents and has no
opportunity to find them out. This approach is no doubt convenient for
banks, and they (or other parties who control adhesionary contracts) may
try to bolster unfair practice by making it customary.230 Such a move is
indeed encouraged by U.C.C. sections 4-104(1)(c) and 3-103(a)(7). The
definition of "agreement" in Article 4 is simple legislative fiat. It has
nothing to do with assent, and any justification for it must be found
elsewhere.
In this regard, another point should be mentioned even though it falls
outside the scope of the present inquiry. As the comments to the present
Code acknowledge, a dishonest or unconscionable practice may some-
times become standard.231 As with express terms, customary terms may
favor one side to an extent that the law cannot stomach. Some express
contracts, therefore, are invalidated despite the parties' assent, and the
same should hold for customary terms (or terms based on conduct) when
they are in bad faith or unconscionable. 23
2
C. OPTING OUT: ASSENT, ARBITRATION, AND
ALTERNATIVE REGIMES
The argument here does not claim that assent-based construction is the
single superior method for everyone. The regime of the Code is de-
fended; it is the rule of law, as applied in the courts. Parties can escape
the Code and its regime, however, and there is nothing wrong with their
doing so. Their decision to put aside the Code and exit the courts is not
an indictment of the entire system.233 Exit may be more efficient for par-
228. See 1 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 22, § 3-3, at 114-15 & n.4; Barnett, Silence,
supra note 89, at 906 ("What exactly is the 'relevant community of discourse'?"); Wood-
ward, supra note 33. For a justification of the objective theory, even from the perspective
of one who strongly propounds a consent theory of contract, see Barnett, Silence, supra
note 89, at 857-59. For an economic justification for applying trade usage to those in the
trade, see Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale
for an Inflexible Rule, 42 Pirr. L. REV. 515 (1981).
229. U.C.C. § 4-103(b).
230. See also Bernstein, supra note 37, at 779 n.246.
231. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 6. See generally Danzig, supra note 12.
232. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302. On the regulatory role for contract law, even contrary
to traditional assent, see generally Braucher, supra note 106. See also supra note 108.
233. See Charny, supra note 33, at 843 ("[Tlrade association formalism ... does not
counsel formalism in commercial law generally").
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ticular parties, especially if they are part of an idiosyncratic or homogene-
ous group.234 This option is especially important because the Code lacks
a "safe harbor" provision that would allow the parties to signal their pref-
erence for a different interpretive regime.2 35
Judicial adjudication involves the coercion of the state. That coercion
must somehow be justified.2 36 Assent is the basis for that justification in
this Article, as elsewhere.2 37 Of course many different kinds of con-
tracting parties may find the Code regime uncongenial, just as they may
find the judicial system inconvenient. Particular merchant groups may
prefer a different regime and a different system. 238 They may prefer ad-
judication by peers, with its inherently different interpretive regime.2 39
But a prerequisite for the different regime is that the parties assent to it.
They cannot reach arbitration and its alternative possibilities without
their own valid agreement. That agreement provides the necessary
justification.
The same is not true of courts or the interpretive tools that they use.
As parties do not consent to judicial jurisdiction and to the law in the
same way that they consent to arbitration, the legal regime must itself
take assent into account. The arbitral regime need not, since it only has
jurisdiction over parties who have consented to arbitration.2 40 And while
some merchants may prefer particular mechanisms that they can obtain




The use of custom and conduct in the construction of contracts has
lately come under increasing challenge. Perceptive and careful scholar-
234. See Kraus & Walt, supra note 37, at 214-17.
235. Several scholars have suggested that parties be allowed a "safe harbor" provision
to signal their interpretive preference. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1820-21; Kraus &
Walt, supra note 37, at 219; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 34, at 263 (discussing burden
on those wishing to opt out of state-created default rules). The revision does not follow
this suggestion. From the perspective of assent, a safe harbor that the parties could agree
to would be a healthy step. From a practical and theoretical standpoint, however, it is hard
to know how a safe harbor would work. If the parties invoke the safe harbor provision and
tell the judge not to look to custom or conduct, how is the judge supposed to know, say,
what a "load" of lettuce is? See KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d
286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (a load is 40,000 to 48,000 pounds). Such a safe harbor, by shut-
ting out part of the parties' language, would close their dictionary to the judge.
236. See Burton, supra note 89, at 117.
237. See supra Part III.A.1.
238. See Bernstein, supra note 34; Bernstein, supra note 37; Lisa Bernstein, Opting out
of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115 (1992).
239. The neoformalists suggest that the regime is legal formalism. See Scott, supra note
9, at 873. See generally Bernstein, supra note 34; Bernstein, supra note 37. For the reasons
stated above, I am not sure. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
240. Again, the question of whether certain manifestations of assent should be invali-
dated-perhaps because the law suspects the assent is unreal-is beyond the scope of this
inquiry. See supra note 108.
241. See Scott, supra note 9, at 873 n.78.
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ship raises important questions. Some of these questions can be an-
swered, though, in favor of continuing the role of usage of trade, course
of dealing, and course of performance in the revision of the UCC. They
are an integral part of the parties' agreement. Like the words the parties
use in a written contract, usage of trade and course of dealing constitute a
part of the parties' language. Courts ignore that language, verbal and
nonverbal, at the risk of ignoring the parties' manifested assent. Al-
though course of performance presents a weaker linguistic case, it is im-
portant, particularly in a legal context, because it partakes of the
cautionary, evidentiary, and channeling functions of a natural legal for-
mality. The Code does well to retain custom and conduct as constituents
of the parties' agreement. To do otherwise would be to reject or
subordinate assent as a basis for contractual liability.
